Appeals Court Vacates Ezekiel Elliott's Injunction, Clears Path To Suspension [Updated] - Page 2 of 2

Elliott had filed his suit after arbitration proceedings had been completed, but before the arbiter actually came down with a decision. Because of this, according to the court, “the procedures provided for in the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and NFLPA were not exhausted,” and Elliott’s suspension should be upheld.

This ruling eliminates the previous injunction that allowed Elliott to continue playing despite his suspension. The Cowboys are on a bye this weekend, but in order to attempt to keep playing, Elliott and the NFLPA will reportedly refile for an injunction in New York.

The ruling in full can be found below:

No. 17-409368

Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc.

, 566 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1978) (internalcitations omitted).

The NFLPA only argues the repudiation exception to the exhaustionrequirements applies. An allegation that an employer has repudiated thegrievance process is not substantiated merely by its “refusal to accept anemployee’s position with respect to a grievance.”

Id.

;

see also Meredith

, 209

The dissenting opinion argues that the existence of exceptions to the exhaustionrequirement undermines the NFL’s argument that exhaustion is a jurisdictionalprerequisite. However, these exceptions are better thought of as exceptional circumstancesin which arbitral processes are deemed “concluded” absent final arbitral awards. Here, themere fact that the record was closed and the arbitrator had issued final evidentiary rulingsis not an exceptional circumstance where we should deem the arbitral process as concludedabsent a final award. The existence of adverse evidentiary rulings against a party does notindicate that it is a foregone conclusion that the arbitrator will issue an award adverse tothat party. An adverse evidentiary ruling does not a judgment make.

The dissenting opinion conflates a claim for breach of a collective bargainingagreement with an allegation that the employer repudiated the collective bargainingagreement. An allegation that an employer did not abide by the terms of a collectivebargaining agreement during the grievance process is not equivalent to an allegation theemployer refused to participate in the grievance procedures provided by the collectivebargaining agreement. An allegation of the latter is required to show the repudiationexception applies.Citing to an out-of-circuit case, the dissenting opinion argues it has not conflated aclaim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement with a claim for repudiation of acollective bargaining agreement.

Ramirez-Lebron v. International Shipping Agency, Inc.

, 593F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2010), however, is easily distinguishable.

Ramirez-Lebron

involved twogroups of employees with conflicting seniority claims, where one group of employees and theemployer allegedly entered into a “sham, secret agreement” that was submitted to thearbitrator. 593 F.3d at 127–28. Both groups of employees were supposed to appear beforean arbitrator, but that hearing was suspended and the arbitrator subsequently issued anaward allegedly based on the secret agreement between only one group of employees and theemployer, without the second group of employees ever participating in the arbitral process.

Id.

at 128–29, 135. The second group of employees alleged the employer breached thecollective bargaining agreement and repudiated the arbitration process by inducing thearbitrator to issue an arbitral award based on a fraudulent scheme.

Id.

at 128. The

Ramirez-Lebron

employer simultaneously breached and repudiated the collective bargainingagreement because it allegedly fraudulently induced the arbitrator to enter an awardbenefitting one group of employees, which had the effect of excluding from the arbitral processanother group of employees with access to that same process under the collective bargainingagreement.

Id.

at 134–35. Here, the dissenting opinion admits “there is no claim of fraud.”Likewise, here, there is no allegation a party is being excluded from the arbitration process,as the group of plaintiff employees were in

Ramirez-Lebron

Case: 17-40936 Document: 00514193815 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/12/2017

No. 17-409369F.3d at 403 (holding the repudiation exception applied where an employerclaimed the employee “was not covered by the collective bargaining agreementand did not consider her grievance”). “An employer can obviously take a stancecontrary to that of the employee during the grievance process without beingdeemed to have repudiated that process.”

Rabalais

, 566 F

2d at 520. Here, itis undisputed the NFL and Elliott were engaged in arbitration as provided forunder the collective bargaining agreement. Unlike

Meredith

, where theemployer refused to consider the grievance under the collective bargainingagreement, the NFL cannot be said to have repudiated the agreement here.The NFLPA takes issue with the outcome and fairness of the arbitrationproceedings. However, for the repudiation exception to the exhaustionrequirements to apply, the NFL would have had to completely refuse to engagein the process.

See Meredith

, 209 F.3d at 403. Accordingly, the court finds therepudiation exception does not apply and Elliott was required to exhaust hiscontractual remedies before filing his lawsuit.When the NFLPA filed the complaint on August 31, 2017, the arbitratorhad not yet issued his decision. Although the district court issued theinjunction on September 8, 2017, and the arbitrator had previously issued hisdecision on September 5, 2017, jurisdiction depends on the facts as they existwhen the complaint was filed.

See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain

, 490U.S. 826, 830 (1982). The district court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the preliminary injunction.

Much of the dissenting opinion is devoted to examining the merits of the NFLPA’slawsuit. While these arguments and concerns about the arbitration process may have merit,they must be considered by a court with proper jurisdiction.

See Home Builders Ass’n ofMiss., Inc.

, 143 F.3d at 1010 (“When courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over a case, theylack the power to adjudicate the case.”);

Morrison v. Nat. Austl. Bank, Ltd.

, 561 U.S. 247, 254(2010) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction is “an issue quite separate from the questionof whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief”).

Case: 17-40936 Document: 00514193815 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/12/2017